

Mandatory Retirement and Age, Race, and Gender Diversity of University Faculties*

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Abstract

While many have documented the changing demographics of universities, understanding the effects of prohibiting mandatory retirement (“uncapping”) has proved challenging. We digitize detailed directories of all American law school faculty from 1971-2017 and show that uncapping in 1994 had dramatic effects. From 1971 to 1993, the percent of faculty above 70 – when mandatory retirement would typically have been triggered – remained stable at 1%, but starting in 1994, that proportion increased to 14%. We use a permutation test of moving cohorts to show that these increases are attributable to uncapping. Roughly 39% of faculty members would counterfactually have been subject to mandatory retirement. Effects were less pronounced at public schools, which were more likely to have defined benefits retirement plans. Second, we show that schools with the highest proportion of faculty over 70, and thus most impacted by uncapping, also exhibit the slowest integration of female and minority faculty members. Our study highlights cross-cutting effects of civil rights laws: preventing age discrimination can have collateral effects on racial and gender integration.

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1 Introduction

In 1986, Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to prohibit mandatory retirement in most forms of employment. Due to the unique characteristics of the tenure system, Congress granted a seven-year exemption for faculty at institutions of higher education and mandated further research on potential effects of “uncapping” on colleges and universities. Some voiced concerns about fiscal pressures, innovation, and productivity (Casper and Mac Lane, 1990; Pratt, 1989). For example, then-University of Chicago Provost Gerhard Casper argued uncapping was a “grave mistake” that would cause “the heavy hand of old ideas [to] restrict new contributions in the classroom and laboratory” (Casper and Mac Lane, 1990). A much smaller minority worried about effects on diversification. A working group of the American Association of University Professors noted that the retention of predominantly white male faculty could “preclude[] replacement by women and minorities” (Brown et al., 1987).

However, the leading studies on the topic, which examined a small number of early uncapping states, concluded that uncapping would have negligible effects. The National Academy of Sciences’ report concluded uncapping “is unlikely to affect the vast majority of colleges and universities because most faculty members now retire well before age 70” (National Research Council, 1991). Another influential study concluded, “most of higher education will not be seriously affected” (Rees and Smith, 1991). A committee assembled by the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) similarly reported, “it does not foresee a dramatic alteration in the overall retirement pattern of law faculty following 1993” (The Association of American Law Schools, 1990). Based on these reports, Congress allowed the university exemption to lapse in 1994, thereby uncapping American universities.

The accuracy of these early predictions remains contested. Over the past decades, the age composition of university faculty has shifted substantially, leading to what has been called the “graying” of faculty and academic research (Kaiser, 2008; Jane, 2012). These trends have been documented in a variety of fields, including in engineering, medicine, the humanities, and the sciences (Blau and Weinberg, 2017; Conn, 2010; Ghaffarzadegan and Xu, 2018; Hershel and Liu,

45 2009). Researchers have found significant increases in the average age of faculty, declines in
46 rates of faculty retirement, and shifts in the distribution of research dollars to older faculty. The
47 National Institutes of Health, for example, predicted that by 2020 grantees over the age of 68 would
48 outnumber those under 38 (Kaiser, 2008).

49 A particular challenge in existing research lies in isolating the effects of the *policy* intervention
50 uncapping. Moreover, no study has been able to assess whether uncapping affected the pace of
51 racial and gender diversification amongst faculty, in spite of strong reasons to expect such cross-
52 cutting effects. In many academic fields, uncapping went into effect at a time when the compo-
53 sition of senior faculty was predominantly white and male, whereas women and minorities were
54 increasingly comprising a larger share of the hiring pool (National Science Foundation, 2019). To
55 present day, the entry-level hiring pool continues to be more demographically diverse than incum-
56 bent faculty (National Science Foundation, 2019; Li and Koedel, 2017). Delayed retirements due
57 to uncapping may have slowed hiring and hence diversification.

58 We address the gaps in the literature using a setting that offers a unique opportunity to study
59 the effects of uncapping. For over fifty years, the American Association of Law Schools (AALS)
60 has published directories containing rich biographical and demographic details of all U.S. law
61 faculty. We digitize these directories from 1971 to the present and assemble nearly five decades
62 of data on faculty composition, including gender, age, and racial minority status of 14,908 faculty
63 members in 166 schools. This data—rare in its scope across institutions, its comprehensiveness
64 within institutions, and its inclusion of individual demographic detail—permits us to study the
65 effect of uncapping on both the age composition and diversification of faculties.

66 First, we leverage the arbitrariness of the typical mandatory retirement age of 70 to isolate
67 the effect of uncapping as distinct from secular demographic changes. We show that uncapping
68 had dramatic long-term effects on the age composition of faculties. The proportion of faculty
69 members above 70 was stable at around 1% in all years prior to uncapping, but increased by
70 ten-fold after uncapping. Among faculty who would have been subject to mandatory retirement
71 between 1994-2017 (i.e., who would have turned 70 in the period), 39% elected to work past age

72 70. Using a nonparametric permutation test of cohorts reaching retirement eligibility immediately
73 before and after uncapping, we show that these patterns are attributable to uncapping. We also
74 provide evidence of the role of retirement incentives, as public schools, which disproportionately
75 retained (defined benefit) plans that muted incentives to delay retirement, appeared less affected
76 by uncapping. Second, we show that the sharp rise in retirement-eligible faculty is associated with
77 reduced racial and gender diversification. We use covariance-adjusted permutation inference to
78 rule out no effects of retirement eligible faculty on female and minority faculty members, and offer
79 evidence that the most likely mechanism is in reducing the volume of entry-level hiring.

80 Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the existing and related
81 literature. Section 3 discusses our data sources. Section 4 presents results of the effects on the
82 age of faculties, the mediating effect of retirement incentives, and the effects on racial and gender
83 diversity. Section 5 discusses limitations and Section 6 concludes.

84 **2 Extant Literature**

85 Since the early reports, a small number of studies has attempted to address the effects of uncapping
86 on universities. One leading study of a national sample of institutions from 1987-96 found that
87 fewer faculty retired upon reaching age 70 and 71 after institutions uncapped (Ashenfelter and
88 Card, 2002). The data, however, included only three years of observations after federal uncapping.
89 An analysis over a longer time window may be important because (a) uncapping was prospective,
90 not retroactive, and the effect would hence necessarily be gradual, accumulating as more faculty
91 reached the age of 70; (b) rapid hiring of junior faculty in the 1960s in response to enrollment
92 increases from baby boomers created a “bulge” of faculty who did not face the retirement age of
93 70 until the late 1990s and early 2000s (Ashenfelter and Card, 2002); and (c) potential long-term
94 effects of uncapping may have been mitigated by institutional adaptations, such as the adoption of
95 retirement incentive programs (Clark and Ghent, 2008).

96 Other research has analyzed the effects of uncapping using data from specific institutions (Lar-
97 son and Gomez Diaz, 2012; Clark and Ghent, 2008; Weinberg and Scott, 2013; Clark et al., 2001;

98 Ehrenberg et al., 2001) or from longitudinal surveys of scientific doctoral degree recipients (Blau
99 and Weinberg, 2017; Ghaffarzadegan and Xu, 2018), finding some evidence of delayed retirements
100 and increases in the average age of faculty. While these studies are valuable, many of their designs
101 make it harder to disentangle secular trends (e.g., increased life expectancy, changing attitudes
102 about work) from the effects of uncapping, and it is less certain whether single-institution stud-
103 ies generalize to the population of universities. The only study of professional schools finds that
104 at one university, in contrast to its non-professional schools, retirement behavior was unaltered.
105 Researchers attributed this difference to lucrative opportunities available in medicine, law, and
106 business following retirement (Weinberg and Scott, 2013).

107 As far as we are aware, no prior study has examined the collateral effects of uncapping on the
108 pace of racial and gender diversification, in spite of the acknowledged importance of faculty di-
109 versity for innovation, research, and students (Brest and Oshige, 1995; Nielsen et al., 2017, 2018;
110 Bertrand, 2011; Bayer and Rouse, 2016). The closest study, which focused on one institution,
111 inferred that uncapping did not negatively affect diversification, as the proportion of female and
112 minority faculty increased over time (Weinberg and Scott, 2013). Yet if uncapping delays retire-
113 ment, it may slow a *positive rate* of diversification, particularly because entry-level pools have
114 become more diverse over time (National Science Foundation, 2019; Kay and Gorman, 2008).¹

115 Last, existing work on the effects of civil rights laws has focused on the direct effects on
116 protected groups (Oyer and Schaefer, 2003; Donohue and Siegelman, 1990) or groups at the in-
117 tersection of protected categories (Crenshaw, 1989; Best et al., 2011). In the age discrimination
118 context, researchers have documented the effects of the ADEA on employment of older workers
119 (Lahey, 2008; Neumark and Button, 2014) and the challenges older minority and female work-
120 ers in securing protections (Delaney and Lahey, 1989). Our work contributes to this literature
121 by highlighting the cross-cutting tension across civil rights laws: protection along one dimension
122 (age) may undercut advancement along another (gender and race).

¹See also Appendix Figure A3.

123 **3 Data**

124 We digitize and parse over 42,000 pages from 43 volumes of the annual Directories of Law Teach-
125 ers published by the AALS between 1971-2017. These directories contain biographical informa-
126 tion (e.g., degrees, employment history), titles, school affiliations, and demographic attributes for
127 most of the observation period, including birth year, gender, and minority status. Minority faculty
128 members are those self-identifying as Asian American, African American, Mexican American, Na-
129 tive American or Alaskan Native, Hispanic American, or Pacific Islander. We provide additional
130 details in Appendix A, but the overall process worked as follows.

131 First, we use an optical character recognition engine to extract the text stream in each vol-
132 ume. Where the volume was not available in PDF format, we scanned the volumes. When PDFs
133 were available, we used our own optical character recognition engine (Prime Recognition), as this
134 generated higher accuracy than using the existing text stream.

135 Second, we parse school affiliation listings, individual biographical sketches, and minority
136 faculty listings, which come from separate sections in each directory. We classify law teachers
137 into tenured/tenure-track faculty, emeritus faculty, clinical faculty/instructors, and librarians based
138 on titles. For this task, we create a dictionary of all variations of titles. We then consult individual
139 CVs, school directories, and faculty handbooks to map these titles onto classifications and account
140 for variation across schools. Because uncapping affected only tenure and tenure-track faculty, we
141 exclude academic librarians, clinical faculty, and adjunct faculty.

142 Third, we develop semi-automated record linkage methods to structure the data as a relational
143 database of faculty and schools over time. To ensure that our database links faculty with signifi-
144 cant name changes across years, we compare all possible pairs of unique faculty members in our
145 database using a liberal fuzzy match and manually verify all matches. Fourth, we augment school
146 information (e.g., ranking of school, public vs. private school).

147 Last, we engage in considerable manual and semi-automated validation, completion, and cor-
148 rection of data fields. For instance, we look up CVs and biographies of all faculty (a) missing birth
149 years after 2007 (when AALS ceases to report birth year) and (b) changing employment status in

150 years where the volume was not published (2008, 2012, and 2013). Where birth year is missing,
151 we impute age based on degree dates. The imputation model has an R^2 of 0.98 for when degree
152 and birth year are both observed. Where gender is missing, we use a model based on Social Se-
153 curity Administration baby names and manually look up all faculty with gender-ambiguous names
154 (e.g., “Taylor”). Our estimated accuracy with gender prediction is 99%. We also assess sensitivity
155 to minority self-reporting by using ethnicity predictions from a neural network trained on census
156 names.²

157 Our data has several virtues. In contrast to longitudinal surveys, it contains the entire faculty
158 composition of each school. The directories span over two decades before and after uncapping,
159 allowing us to observe long-term changes in faculties. The fact that specific birth years were
160 reported for most volumes enables us to measure age reliably. Information on gender and minority
161 status permit us to study the effects of uncapping on diversification.

162 The final dataset consists of 14,908 unique tenure or tenure-track faculty members, including
163 3,544 white women, 757 minority women, and 901 minority men. It covers 166 law schools, 43%
164 of which are public schools, with 269,881 school-faculty-year tuples. Because of the unique dy-
165 namics, our main analysis excludes historically black universities, schools outside the continental
166 United States, and the Judge Advocate General’s School. As we identify effects based on changes,
167 we also exclude schools after a merger or split and law schools that existed exclusively before or
168 after uncapping. Our results are the same including these schools.³

169 Figure 1 displays the faculty age distribution for each year before uncapping (left panel) and af-
170 ter uncapping (right panel), demonstrating a substantial demographic shift over time. This growth
171 reflects broader demographic changes over time, and we focus specifically on effects around the
172 mandatory retirement age of 70 (gray vertical line) in our analyses.

²See Appendix B.4.

³See Appendix F.6.




Figure 1: Kernel density plot of faculty age across all schools for each year.

4 Results

4.1 The Effect of Uncapping on Retirement

We first examine the effects of uncapping on faculty retirement behavior. Figure 2 displays the percentage of faculty above 70 from 1971 to 2017. Each dot represents one school, weighted by faculty size, with year on the x -axis and the proportion of faculty above 70 on the y -axis. While retirement eligibility depends on individual circumstances and institutions, we use the phrases “above 70” and “retirement-eligible” interchangeably to refer to faculty aged 70 or above, who would have been subject to mandatory retirement without uncapping. Whereas this percentage was stable and approximately 1% in all years before uncapping, the proportion of the faculty above 70 has grown sharply after uncapping, increasing from 1.4% in 1993 to 14.0% in 2017. Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law, for example, had 2 and 1 faculty members over 70 in 1993, but by 2017, one-fifth and nearly one-third of their faculties would have been subject to mandatory retirement, respectively.⁴ To place this increase in context, Figure 3 compares population demographics over time. The proportion of the U.S. population above 70 is much smoother and does not exhibit any break point around 1994.

To isolate the immediate effects of uncapping, we construct neighboring cohorts $c \in \{1, 2\}$ of

⁴The outlier school in the beginning of the observation period, with nearly 40% of its faculty above 70 in the early 1970s, is U.C. Hastings, which affirmatively hired attorneys at the tail-end of their careers to boost its reputation, leading its faculty to refer to Hastings as the “65 Club” (Barnes, 1978)




Figure 2: Proportion of faculty over the age of 70. Each dot represents a school and the size of the dots represents the overall faculty size. The red line represents the the average proportion across all schools for a given year.

189 faculty who were either just subject to or not subject to mandatory retirement solely due to birth
 190 year. We compare faculty turning 70 during the three years before uncapping (1991-1993) with
 191 faculty turning 70 during the three years after uncapping (1995-1997). The left panel of Figure 4
 192 presents Kaplan-Meier survival curves in these cohorts. While curves are comparable prior to age
 193 69, they sharply diverge after the retirement age of 70. We test for the difference in survival curves
 194 using a logrank test. Under the null hypothesis of no distributional difference between cohorts, the
 195 χ^2 test statistic should follow a χ_1^2 distribution:

$$\chi^2 = \sum_c \frac{(\sum_t O_{ct} - \sum_t E_{ct})^2}{\sum_t E_{ct}} \quad (1)$$

196 where $\sum_t O_{ct}$ is the sum of observed departures in cohort c over age t and $\sum_t E_{ct}$ is the sum of
 197 expected departures in cohort c over age t . Membership in the uncapped cohort is associated with
 198 a median increase in faculty tenure of 7.5 years (p -value = 0.0015). We note that because the
 199 sharpest shift occurs right at the mandatory retirement age, the difference is unlikely explained by
 200 secular demographic shifts.




Figure 3: Proportion of faculty over the age of 70. The red line represents the the average proportion of faculty over 70 across all schools for a given year. The gray line represents the proportion of the U.S. population over 70 for a given year. Source for U.S. population data is the U.S. Census.

201 We further conduct a nonparametric permutation-based test to rule out the possibility that the
 202 increase is due to trends of aging between the cohorts. We treat each year between 1988-2013 as a
 203 placebo year of uncapping, denoted by the set $\omega \in \{1988, \dots, 2013\}$ of size 26. Let χ_{ω}^2 represent
 204 the test statistic from Equation 1 given placebo year ω of uncapping, capturing the difference in
 205 the survival curves of faculty cohorts turning 70 within 3 years before and after each placebo
 206 year. We calculate this test statistic across all placebo years and calculate the one-tailed p -value by
 207 comparing the observed test statistic χ_{1994}^2 against the placebo distribution:

$$\Pr(\chi_{1994}^2 \leq \chi_{\omega}^2) = \frac{\sum_{\omega} \mathbb{1}(\chi_{1994}^2 \leq \chi_{\omega}^2)}{26} \quad (2)$$

208 If the shift in the left panel of Figure 4 is due to aging, the observed χ_{1994}^2 test statistic should be
 209 drawn from the placebo distribution. The right panel of Figure 4 presents the distribution of test
 210 statistics. In contrast to what would be expected under the null, the observed distributional shift
 211 around 1994 is an extreme outlier. We can hence reject the null hypothesis of no effect attributable
 212 to uncapping in 1994 (p -value = 0.04, the lowest possible p -value with 26 test statistics).

213 Our results show that uncapping appeared to have substantial effects on the age composition
 214 of law schools. Prior to uncapping, very few faculty continued to serve past the age of 70, due
 215 to mechanistic enforcement of mandatory retirement policies. Among faculty who would have




Figure 4: Survival analysis. Left: Kaplan-Meier survival curves for a cohort subject to the cap in red (i.e., tenured faculty active at the age of 50 who turned 70 in the 3 years before uncapping) and a cohort not subject to the cap in blue (i.e., tenured faculty active at the age of 50 who turned 70 in the 3 years after uncapping). We reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are the same using a logrank test, with p -value reported on the top right. Right: Distribution of logrank test statistics for differences in survival curves for cohorts of faculty turning 70 three years before and after the observed uncapping year and placebo uncapping years (all other years between 1988-2013).

216 turned 70 between 1994-2017, 39% elected to work past age 70. While we focused on neighboring
 217 cohorts to isolate the short-run effects of uncapping, Figure 2 also suggests that the long-run cumu-
 218 lative effects are substantial. Roughly 14% of faculty positions are occupied by retirement-eligible
 219 faculty in 2017.

220 4.2 The Impact of Retirement Incentives

221 We now examine whether differences in retirement incentives may have mitigated the effects of
 222 uncapping on retirement behavior. This mechanism is important for two reasons. First, it provides
 223 another avenue to distinguish whether the growth in retirement-eligible faculty post-1994 is due
 224 to secular trends or uncapping. If such growth were purely driven by secular trends, we would
 225 not expect retirement incentives to interact with uncapping. Second, if retirement incentives do in
 226 fact mitigate the effect of uncapping, these findings would highlight an important policy lever for
 227 states and universities in addressing the changing demographics of faculty. To examine the impact
 228 of retirement incentives, we explored a wide range of data sources, but comprehensive historical
 229 information at the individual school level about retirement programs are exceedingly difficult to

230 recover. We hence leverage the fact that there are well-known differences in retirement incentives
231 across public and private schools.

232 Most faculty nearing retirement at public institutions prior to and in the two decades following
233 uncapping had defined benefit (DB) retirement plans, whereas most retirement-age faculty at pri-
234 vate institutions had defined contribution (DC) plans (King and Cook, 1980; Holden and Hansen,
235 2001; Ehrenberg and Rizzo, 2001). In DB plans, the employer guarantees to pay employees an
236 annual pension throughout retirement, which is determined by a formula that multiplies employ-
237 ees' years of service, average salary, and other factors. In contrast, in a DC plan, employers and
238 employees make annual contributions (typically as a percentage of employee salary) into an in-
239 vestment fund. Employers do not guarantee a specified benefit at the time of retirement; rather, the
240 benefit reflects the total contributions and dividends as affected by market fluctuations. Although
241 an increasing number of public institutions began in the 1990s and early 2000s to offer a DC plan
242 exclusively, a choice between a DB and a DC plan, or a hybrid plan, these changes primarily ap-
243 plied to new hires (Lahey et al., 2008). Thus, for most of our observation window, we expect that
244 faculty at public institutions who were retirement-eligible were covered under DB plans.

245 DB plans tend to have weaker incentives to delay retirement compared to DC plans (Rees and
246 Smith, 1991; Clark and Ghent, 2008; Ehrenberg and Rizzo, 2001; Issacharoff and Harris, 1997).
247 As Issacharoff and Harris put it, "Defined-contribution plans . . . clearly create incentives toward
248 late retirement" (Issacharoff and Harris, 1997). This is so for at least three reasons. First, because
249 often "defined benefits plans have large, age-specific retirement incentives at the early and normal
250 retirement ages," pension wealth in DB plans "rises more slowly and can actually decline, once
251 the worker becomes eligible to start receiving benefits" (Clark and Ghent, 2008). In contrast, DC
252 plans have been described as "more age neutral in their retirement effects and the present value
253 of the pension continues to rise with continued employment" (Clark and Ghent, 2008). Effective
254 age-specific retirement incentives are more likely to be integrated into DB plans because of the
255 plan's structure. As Ehrenberg explains, "It is easy to build retirement incentives into DB plans
256 by offering individuals credit for additional years of service if they retire before a specified age.




Figure 5: Survival Curves By School Type. Kaplan-Meier survival curves for three year cohorts subject to cap (left) and not subject to cap (right) by public school (green) and private school (purple). While most faculty retire by 70 pre-1994, the survival curve shifts more substantially to the right for private schools post-1994.

257 It is much more difficult and expensive, however, to build effective retirement incentives into DC
 258 programs, because additional contributions made by employers to encourage retirement are subject
 259 to federal and state income taxes in the year the contributions are made” (Ehrenberg et al., 2001).

260 Second, DB plans may provide greater certainty about benefits. Under DB plans, employers
 261 guarantee to pay employees a predetermined annuity for life. Under DC plans, employees assume
 262 the risk that they will outlive the funds in their accounts and face uncertainties about whether
 263 market downturns or poor investment decisions will significantly erode their funds (Michel et al.,
 264 2010). Such market uncertainty may be why we observe such a substantial increase in retirement-
 265 eligible faculty after the Great Recession.

266 Third, DB plans at public institutions may also spur earlier retirements because they provided
 267 greater pension wealth than DC plans at private universities.⁵ Many studies have reported that
 268 public-sector DB pensions tend to offer annuities that are more valuable, on average, than private-
 269 sector DC plans (Craig, 2014; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 2014).⁶

270 We hence expect that fewer faculty would continue to work past age 70 at public law schools.

⁵Prior studies have found that pension wealth is positively correlated with retirement probabilities (Ashenfelter and Card, 2002; Clark et al., 2001).

⁶That said, it is difficult to confirm whether such a disparity existed between plans at public and private law schools. We are unaware of a study that has compared pension wealth or retirement benefits at public versus private law schools.




Figure 6: Faculty Over 70 By School Type. Average proportion of faculty over the age of 70 at private (purple) and public (green) law schools. The vertical line indicates the year mandatory retirement was uncapped (1994).

271 Figure 5 presents Kaplan-Meier survival curves comparing three year cohorts subject to and not
 272 subject to the cap at public (green) and private (purple) institutions. This figure shows that faculty
 273 at public law schools are significantly less likely to continue working past age 70 than faculty
 274 at private law schools after uncapping. Figure 6 presents more detailed results on the temporal
 275 dynamics associated with uncapping. Prior to 1994, public and private schools differ very little in
 276 the proportion of retirement-eligible faculty. After 1994, there is a sharp divergence between public
 277 and private schools, with the retirement-eligible faculty significantly higher at private schools than
 278 at public schools. In 2017, roughly 10.7% of public school faculty were above 70 compared to
 279 16.1% of private school faculty. These findings suggest that retirement incentives play an important
 280 role in mediating the effect of uncapping.

281 While retirement plan type is the most widely studied distinction between retirement incen-
 282 tives at public and private institutions, we acknowledge that other differences between may exist
 283 between public and private schools. That said, Figures 5 and 6 show that the difference emerges
 284 around the time of uncapping. For a difference between public and private institutions to explain
 285 this divergence would require a source confounding *contemporaneous* to 1994. The only plausible
 286 time-varying intervention that differentially affected public and private schools would have been
 287 the Supreme Court’s decision in *Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents*, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). In *Kimel*,

288 the Court held that public institutions were immune from suits alleging violations of the federal
289 ADEA. As a result, public universities may have faced weaker repercussions for continuing to
290 enforce mandatory retirement than private universities. Yet there are reasons to doubt that *Kimel*
291 explains these findings. First, the divergence between public and private schools appears imme-
292 diately after uncapping, as seen in Figure 5, nearly six years before *Kimel*. Second, the effects
293 of *Kimel* were limited, as many public universities remained subject to state age discrimination
294 statutes and the federal government could still bring discrimination suits against public universi-
295 ties (Bodensteiner and Levinson, 2001). In any case, while *Kimel* could weaken the explanation of
296 the role of retirement benefits, it would strengthen the case of the role of mandatory retirement.

297 In short, our findings suggest that retirement benefits play a significant mediating role in the
298 effects of uncapping on the age distribution of faculties.

299 **4.3 Effects on Racial and Gender Diversity**

300 We now investigate the collateral effects of uncapping on gender and racial diversity. The main
301 mechanism we focus on is (a) whether uncapping reduced the volume of entry-level hiring due to
302 billet and resource constraints, and (b) whether uncapping hence reduced the number female and
303 minority candidates hired, given that much more diversity exists in the entry-level pool.

304 To understand this mechanism, it is valuable to observe the long-term context surrounding
305 uncapping. Figure 7 provides cross-sectional snapshots of the demographics of law schools at the
306 beginning of our observation period in 1971 (top), the year before uncapping in 1993 (middle),
307 and the most recent observed year in 2017 (bottom). The left column of panels displays the age
308 distribution by race, with majority faculty in blue and minority faculty in red. The right column
309 of panels displays the age distribution by gender, with male faculty in green and female faculty in
310 yellow. The top panels show that there were very few women and minorities serving as faculty at
311 the beginning of our observation period. Only 1.7% of law professors were minority faculty and
312 only 3.1% of law professors were women.

313 The middle panel of Figure 7 shows that at the time of uncapping, faculty turning 70 within five




Figure 7: Age distribution of faculty by race and gender in 1971, 1993 and 2017. The left panel shows overlaid histograms of minority and majority faculty members in each age range, while the right panel shows overlaid histograms of female and male faculty members in each age range.

314 years were disproportionately white (98%) and male (92%). As can be seen by the age distribution
315 differences between (a) majority and minority faculty in the middle left panel and (b) male and
316 female faculty in the middle right panel, the primary source for gender and racial diversity for
317 much of the observation period was in entry-level hiring. For instance, in 1993, roughly 47% of
318 women were tenured, compared to 80% of men. This difference stems from formal and informal
319 barriers into the profession in the 20th century (Abel, 1989). Only 4% of lawyers were female
320 in 1970 and because faculty positions typically require a J.D., and often some degree of practice
321 experience, diversification of law faculties lags behind diversification of the profession (Epstein,
322 1993, p. 5).

323 The bottom panel confirms that the faculty that have benefited from uncapping by working past
324 age 70 have been disproportionately white males. This trend is not merely the case in the cross-
325 section, but in the decades following uncapping, white men comprise 85% of retirement eligible
326 law faculty. Even in the most recent observed year, over 80% of retirement eligible faculty were
327 men.

328 Figure 8 presents data for all schools from 1971-2017 of the average proportion of each faculty
329 that is female (left) and minority (right). Each dot represents a school, weighted by faculty size.
330 Recall that from Figure 2, the proportion of faculty above 70 remained constant and close to zero
331 from 1971 to 1993. The time trend plotted in red in Figure 8 shows that the proportion of female
332 and minority faculty increased steadily prior to uncapping. After uncapping, the rate of racial di-
333 versification appears to have slowed substantially. The decrease in diversification does not appear
334 to be a result of diminished diversity in the entry-level pool. Using hand-collected information
335 from the “register of candidates” for the central faculty hiring conference, we find that the propor-
336 tion of applicants who are female and who are minorities has been increasing over time from 1990
337 to the present.⁷ While the slowing rate of diversification in hires, given an increasingly diverse
338 entry-level pool, is interesting and important in its own right, the question remains to what extent
339 the slowing rate of diversification is attributable to uncapping.

⁷See Appendix Figure A3




Figure 8: Female and minority faculty. Proportion of faculty that is female (left panel) and minority (right panel) over time. Each dot represents a school, weighted by faculty size, and red lines plot the average proportions across all schools for each year.

340 To examine this more systematically, we leverage variation in the proportion of the faculty
 341 above 70 across schools. The intuition behind this approach is that (a) faculty hiring is constrained
 342 by budgets and billets; and (b) the extent that uncapping constrains entry-level hiring depends on
 343 the number of positions occupied by retirement eligible faculty. To provide graphical intuition,
 344 we divide schools into the most and least affected by retirement-eligible faculty, based on whether
 345 the proportion above 70 is above or below the median across the observation period. If uncapping
 346 affects hiring via the posited mechanism, we should observe these schools diverge after uncapping
 347 in hiring of female and minority faculty. Panels A, B, and C of Figure 9 confirm this dynamic.
 348 While gender and minority integration was indistinguishable between the most and least affected
 349 schools prior to 1994, the schools most affected by uncapping were substantially slower to diversify
 350 after 1994. What is particularly compelling about these visualizations is that the divergence occurs
 351 exactly around 1994, while pre-trends are nearly identical.

352 The bottom row of Figure 9 splits schools by rank to examine whether these trends differed




Figure 9: Diversification by age quantile and rank. Proportions of minority, female, and minority female by age quantile (top row) and by rank (bottom row). In the top row, the blue (red) line represents schools most (least) affected by uncapping. In the bottom row, the purple (green) line represents top 10 (all other) law schools.

353 by rank of school. The panels show that top 10 schools (purple) appeared to be more affected by
 354 uncapping, particularly for minority hiring.⁸ These differences across ranks are consistent with
 355 early research on uncapping in the college setting, which found that a higher school rank (as
 356 proxied by the average student SAT score) was the strongest predictor of delayed faculty retirement
 357 (Rees and Smith, 1991).

We now formalize a test of the impact of uncapping on diversification. We test for the effects of the proportion of faculty above 70 in the preceding academic year on the number of entry-level hires and the number of female, minority, and minority female faculty. To rule out mechanistic effects, we measure retirement eligible faculty in the *preceding* year, when an entry-level hire would typically be made, with a faculty member joining the subsequent year. Our regressions control for school fixed effects to account for (time-invariant) school differences (e.g., public school, re-

⁸Due to fluctuations in ranks, we plot the 14 schools that have been ranked in the top 10 by conventional rankings during the observation period, but results are the same using only the most recent top 10 ranked schools.

gion, general size) and year fixed effects to account for (school-invariant) yearly differences (e.g., diversity of the entry-level pool). Our effects are hence identified by changes in the retirement eligible faculty within the same school over time. Such institution- and time-specific variation in the retirement-eligible faculty – driven by faculty demographics and individual decisions to retire – provide plausibly exogenous variation in how much uncapping affected an institution by constraining billets. We separately model the counts of junior, female, minority, and minority female faculty, denoted as y_{st} , in school s in year t using a quasi-Poisson model:

$$y_{st} \sim \text{Poisson}(\mu_{st}) \tag{3}$$

$$\mu_{st} = n_{st} \exp(\alpha_s + \beta_t + \theta T_{s(t-1)}) \tag{4}$$

$$\text{Var}(y_{st}|\mathbf{X}) = \phi \mu_{st} \tag{5}$$

358 where n_{st} is an offset for the log of the total number of faculty observed at school s in year t , α_s
 359 are school fixed effects, β_t are year fixed effects, $T_{s(t-1)}$ is the proportion of faculty above 70 at
 360 school s in year $t - 1$, and ϕ is a dispersion parameter.⁹ To account for intra-school correlation,
 361 standard errors are clustered by school.

362 Table 1 reports (quasi-poisson) regression results, with main model results in row (1). We
 363 reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of retirement-eligible faculty is not associated with
 364 diversity of the faculty. First, schools with a greater proportion of faculty over 70 have a smaller
 365 junior faculty (column (A)). An increase in retirement-eligible faculty of 12 percentage points (the
 366 magnitude observed since uncapping) is associated with a reduction of 9.3% in junior faculty.
 367 Second, schools with a greater proportion of faculty above 70 have significantly fewer minority
 368 and female faculty members (columns (B) and (C)). An increase in retirement-eligible faculty of
 369 12% is associated with an 6.0% reduction in female faculty and 7.9% reduction in minority faculty.
 370 As seen in Panel F of Figure 9 and Table 1 row (1) column (D), we also find suggestive evidence
 371 that uncapping may have been most detrimental to the inclusion of minority female professors.
 372 The point estimate is substantively larger than the estimate for the aggregated female and minority

⁹This parameter relaxes the assumption of a conventional Poisson model that mean equals variance.

		(A) Junior faculty	(B) Female faculty	(C) Minority faculty	(D) Minority female faculty
(1) Main Sample	Prop. Over 70 N=7,470	-0.81*** (0.32)	-0.51*** (0.15)	-0.69** (0.27)	-1.00** (0.50)
(2) Post-1994 Entrances	Prop. Over 70 N=7,679	-0.48** (0.24)	-0.40*** (0.13)	-0.52** (0.23)	-0.82* (0.45)
(3) HBCUs, HI & PR	Prop. Over 70 N=7,862	-0.49** (0.23)	-0.42*** (0.13)	-0.66*** (0.23)	-0.99** (0.40)
(4) Alternative Aging Measure	Prop. Over 70 base 1993 N=4,111	-0.97*** (0.31)	-0.39*** (0.16)	-0.61** (0.25)	-0.88*** (0.34)

Table 1: Regression Results. Quasi-Poisson count regression results. Row (1) regresses proportion faculty over 70 in the prior year on count junior, female, minority, and minority female faculty with faculty size as an offset. The remaining rows present robustness checks. Rows (2) and (3) include schools opened after 1994 and HBCUs and schools located in Hawaii and Puerto Rico, respectively. Row (4) uses number of faculty over 70 divided by number of faculty in 1993 as the chief explanatory variable. All regressions have school and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. */**/** denote statistical significance at α - levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.

373 category. That said, due to the small number of minority female faculty members, we cannot reject
374 the null that the effect of uncapping on minority women is the same as the effect on white women
375 and minority men.

376 To further test the null hypothesis of no relationship between faculty above 70 and diversity, we
377 again conduct a nonparametric permutation-based test. We permute the time-series vector of the
378 proportion of faculty above 70 across schools and use the coefficient on the proportion of faculty
379 over 70 as noted above in Equation 3 as the test statistic. If there is no effect of faculty above
380 70 on junior faculty hiring and diversification, the coefficients should be drawn from the placebo
381 distribution. The results are presented in Figure 10. In contrast to what would be expected under
382 the null, the observed coefficients fall in the tail-end of the distribution, allowing us to reject the
383 null hypothesis of no effect of retirement eligible faculty on faculty diversity.

384 We present a series of robustness checks in rows (2)-(4) of Table 1. First, our main sample ex-
385 cluded law schools that opened post-1994. We exclude these schools in our main analysis because
386 the research design aims to examine differences before and after elimination of mandatory retire-




Figure 10: Permutation test. Permutation distribution of coefficients on proportion of faculty over 70 on junior (top left), female (top right), minority (bottom left) and minority female (bottom right) faculty.

387 ment. Yet the emergence of new law schools (a) may have been endogenous to uncapping and (b)
 388 may have mitigated effects of uncapping on diversification. By freezing the composition of incum-
 389 bent law schools, uncapping may have facilitated market entrance and enabled these schools to hire
 390 more diverse faculties due to reduced hiring at incumbent schools. The creation of new schools
 391 might hence have aided the diversification of law faculty, even if diversification slowed amongst
 392 incumbent schools. Row (2) of Table 1 estimates our models including these newly established
 393 institutions, and we find comparable results.

394 Second, our main sample excluded historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) and
 395 non-continental schools in Hawaii and Puerto Rico. In 1993, 61.6% of faculty were minority
 396 at these schools, compared to 10.3% at other schools. Including these schools might affect our
 397 analysis by weakening the association between retirement-eligible faculty and diversity and re-
 398 ducing observed diversification amongst all law schools. However, if eliminating mandatory re-

399 tirement reduced entry-level hiring in other schools, it may collaterally have assisted HBCUs and
400 non-continental schools in recruiting minority academics. If true, this effect would mean that the
401 ADEA may not have reduced diversity overall, but increased inter-school segregation. We hence
402 estimate our models including HBCUs and non-continental schools in Row (3) of Table 1. Again,
403 the negative associations between (a) retirement-eligible faculty and (b) junior, minority, or female
404 faculty persist.

405 Third, we examine the possibility that our estimates are confounded by differential growth of
406 schools. Schools may, for instance, have responded to the increase in retirement-eligible faculty
407 by strategically expanding the size of the faculty, potentially motivated by the effects on faculty
408 diversity. We assess this possibility by testing for differences in faculty size as a function of
409 retirement-eligible faculty in the same fixed-effects framework of the previous analyses. We find
410 no evidence that a high proportion of retirement-eligible faculty increases the size or growth of a
411 school. This result makes sense given that many schools face a fixed number of billets and a budget
412 constraint for growth.

413 A related concern is that the growth strategy of a school may simultaneously affect retirements
414 and junior hiring. For instance, if a school has declining student enrollments, that may reduce
415 the number of authorized faculty searches, but also lead the school to be more tolerant of delayed
416 retirements. Alternatively, a school may be investing in growth, therefore discouraging retirements
417 while hiring junior faculty. It is worth noting at the outset, that substantively, such school en-
418 couragement or discouragement of retirement risks liability under the ADEA, so it is not clear
419 how likely this mechanism is. In addition, the second mechanism would, if anything, understate
420 our findings, as it biases estimates against a finding of a negative association between retirement-
421 eligible faculty and diverse faculty. We nonetheless construct an alternative measure of faculty
422 aging to assess robustness to such potential differences in school growth. We do so by calculating
423 the proportion over 70 using a static denominator, namely the faculty size in 1993, prior to federal
424 uncapping. The measure is therefore the number of faculty over 70 in a specific year divided by
425 the total number of faculty at a school in 1993. (Time-invariant size differences are accounted

426 for by school fixed effects.) Row (4) of Table 1 shows the regression results using the proportion
427 of faculty over 70 with 1993 faculty size as the base. Because 1993 is used as the base, we fit
428 regressions for the 1993-2017 period. Our findings remain the same.

429 Fourth, it is possible that as tenured faculty were less likely to retire, schools instead attempted
430 to diversify by hiring of clinical faculty. Clinical faculty are typically hired primarily as instructors
431 for legal clinics that teach students how to handle cases for clients. These positions have less em-
432 phasis on scholarship and academic research and typically are not on the formal tenure-track. We
433 find no evidence to support this hypothesis. While clinical faculty are more likely to be female,
434 the rate of gender integration slows even more dramatically post-1994 for clinical faculty. Clin-
435 ical faculty are less likely to be minority, and integration along racial lines also slows post-1994
436 (Appendix D). These results suggest that uncapping, if anything, also affected clinical hiring.

437 Last, we present a wide range of additional robustness checks in Appendix F. We assess sen-
438 sitivity to (a) potential changes in minority self-identification (using machine learning algorithms
439 to impute race based on name based on census data), (b) exclusion of data after 2011, the year the
440 AALS directory moved to a new data collection system, potentially compromising data quality,
441 (c) including academic librarians, (d) using a fully balanced panel, and (e) including schools that
442 underwent mergers or splits with other schools during the observation window. In all instances,
443 the results remain comparable.

444 **4.4 Policy Simulation**

445 While our focus has been on Congress' decision to eliminate mandatory retirement in higher edu-
446 cation in 1994, we here consider the substantive impact of three policy alternatives.

447 First, we predict faculty diversity if Congress indefinitely exempted colleges and universities
448 from uncapping, similarly to the indefinite exemption it extended to companies with respect to
449 high-level executives. In this scenario, we assume that schools continued to enforce mandatory
450 retirement at age 70 throughout the observation period. Second, we consider an alternative analo-
451 gous to social security reform proposals: indexing mandatory retirement age to life expectancy at

452 age 70 (Isaacs and Choudhury, 2017). For this simulation, we increase the mandatory retirement
453 age to 71 in 1994, 72 in 2003, and 73 in 2009 based on increases in life expectancy in the pop-
454 ulation.¹⁰ Third, we consider if Congress had extended the university exemption from uncapping
455 for 15 years instead of 7 in the 1986 ADEA Amendments. Leading higher education groups such
456 as the American Council on Education and the Association of American Universities had advo-
457 cated for this longer exemption period as a way to “ease out...the large ‘bulge’ of faculty members
458 who initially had been recruited into academe in the 1960s and who were scheduled to retire in
459 large numbers only in the late 1990s and beyond” (Pratt, 1989). This proposal would have allowed
460 schools to continue enforcing mandatory retirement until 2001 as opposed to 1994.


461 Using our regression estimates above, we predict faculty diversity in each year under each of
462 these three scenarios. We calculate 95% confidence intervals using a block bootstrap, resampling
463 with replacement by school to account for intra-school correlation. For each alternative, Figure 11
464 displays the number of “additional faculty,” with 95% confidence interval: the difference between
465 the number of female (left), minority (middle), and minority female (right) faculty predicted and
466 the number observed under uncapping in 1994. As shown in the top panel, continued mandatory
467 retirement at age 70 may have enabled significantly greater gender and racial diversity than we
468 observe under uncapping. For example, across law schools in 2017, we would predict 140 more
469 female professors and 80 more minority professors, including 53 minority female professors.

470 Shifting the mandatory retirement age gradually in accordance with life expectancy increases
471 may have also enabled greater diversity than observed under uncapping as shown in the middle
472 panel of Figure 11. The magnitude of the gain in gender and minority representation, however,
473 would only be half of the gain if mandatory retirement had continued. If the mandatory retirement
474 age had been indexed to life expectancy, we might predict 71 more female professors and 42 more
475 minority professors, including 26 more minority female professors, across law schools in 2017.
476 The jagged gains reflect the fact that the life expectancy adjustment is done on a yearly basis.


¹⁰The measure of life expectancy we use for this analysis is the average number of years a person who attains age 70 can expect to live. Life expectancy data was obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Policy Alternatives

(1) Mandatory Retirement (no uncapping)



(2) Life Expectancy Index



(3) Delayed Uncapping




Figure 11: Policy alternatives. Difference in the number of female (left), minority (middle), and minority female (right) faculty predicted under three alternative policy scenarios and observed under the actual uncapping which took effect in 1994. The three scenarios include continuing mandatory retirement (top), indexing increases in the mandatory retirement age to increases in life expectancy at 70 (middle), and delaying uncapping until 2001 (bottom). Confidence intervals are calculated using a block bootstrap, resampling schools with replacement.

477 Finally, the bottom panel shows that delaying uncapping until 2001 may have resulted in short-
478 term diversity gains in the early 2000s, but would have resulted in indistinguishable rates of diver-
479 sification over the long term. Contrary to claims by proponents of delaying uncapping, retirement
480 of bulge hires in 1990s would not have addressed the age-diversity trade-off for more than a few
481 years.

482 These simulation results help substantively inform the magnitude of the effect of uncapping
483 and calibrate the impact of policy alternatives. That said, these simulations do not account for
484 general equilibrium effects, most importantly that alternative policies may also affect labor market
485 entry by minorities and women. The direction of such general equilibrium effects is unclear. In
486 a world with mandatory retirement, if schools engaged in substantially more entry-level hiring,
487 fewer qualified females and minorities might have been available, making our estimates an upper
488 bound. On the other hand, greater opportunities on the entry-level market may incentivize more
489 females and minorities to enter the academic market, making our simulation results a lower bound.
490 While such effects are hard to quantify, our simulation results suggest that the long-term effects of
491 uncapping may have been substantial.

492 **5 Limitations**

493 We now note several potential limitations to our study. First, while our findings provide strong
494 evidence that mandatory retirement would have substantially altered the age, gender, and racial
495 composition of faculty, we cannot answer a broader counterfactual. It is possible, for instance,
496 that with increasing life expectancy and “bulge” hires nearing retirement-eligibility, universities
497 may independently have been pressured – absent a congressional ADEA amendment – to reform
498 mandatory retirement policies. Our estimates should hence be interpreted as speaking to the effects
499 of uncapping relative to retaining the pre-1994 exemption allowing universities to retain mandatory
500 retirement policies.

501 Second, while we have provided comprehensive evidence of the effects of uncapping in one
502 domain, it is unclear whether these findings generalize to higher education. There are at least

503 some reasons to believe that our findings generalize. Law school faculty are subject to the same
504 tenure policies and retirement benefits as faculty in other departments.¹¹ The relationship between
505 uncapping and diversification stems from three conditions that have been separately documented
506 in other academic fields, most notably in the sciences: (1) delayed retirement of incumbent faculty,
507 (2) increasing diversity of the entry-level hiring pool, and (3) billet and budget constraints on
508 faculty size. The aging of STEM faculty has been widely documented (Blau and Weinberg, 2017;
509 Kaiser, 2008), as has the increasing diversity of entry-level STEM cohorts. In the last two decades,
510 the proportion of doctoral degree recipients in STEM fields that were women increased by between
511 4-11 percentage points, and the share from underrepresented racial minority backgrounds doubled
512 (National Science Foundation, 2019). Yet, with some exceptions, the number of faculty positions
513 in STEM fields has remained constant or grown slowly (Larson et al., 2014). While these three
514 conditions have been studied separately, our work demonstrates that the connections between them
515 may be critical to understanding efforts to diversify institutions.

516 Third, because the AALS directory does not distinguish between minority groups, we are un-
517 able to examine effects on individuals from specific minority groups (e.g., African American vs.
518 Asian American). Understanding such nuances may be important given the evidence of different
519 enrollment trends across demographic subgroups (Chung et al., 2017). A related concern is that
520 self-identification may bias our findings. In the Appendix, we use name-based ethnicity imputa-
521 tions to show that self-identification does not appear to affect results.

522 Fourth, although we have spent extensive time validating our digitization of the volumes, there
523 may still be some degree of measurement error. While such errors may affect individual data
524 points, our large set of robustness checks presented in the Appendix suggest they are unlikely to
525 undercut the broad patterns we report here.

526 Last, while our evidence suggests that uncapping may have slowed diversification at law schools,
527 it of course remains only one policy lever. Many other dimensions affect the representation of
528 women and minorities in universities (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Sheltzer and Smith, 2014), and

¹¹One important distinction is whether salaries are based on “soft money,” but we are not aware of evidence that suggests that aging trends are distinct across hard and soft money environments.

529 our study only points to one structural source.

530 **6 Conclusion**

531 Through collection of a novel data source, we have provided some of the richest, inter-university
532 results to date on the effects of uncapping. Countering earlier findings that uncapping had no ef-
533 fects on professional schools and was associated with increased faculty diversity, we show that
534 the magnitude of impact of uncapping at American law schools has been substantial. Eliminating
535 mandatory retirement succeeded in reducing one form of discrimination against those it was de-
536 signed to protect (individuals above 70). Due to the demographics at the time of uncapping, the
537 immediate benefits extended primarily to white males – a finding consistent with prior research
538 (Rutherglen, 1995; Schuster and Miller, 1984; Issacharoff and Harris, 1997). But it may simul-
539 taneously have impeded the entry of female and minority academics into faculty positions. Our
540 results reveal an underappreciated tension internal to civil rights law: protecting one dimension
541 (age) may undercut advancement along other dimensions (gender and race).¹² Seemingly neutral
542 laws may have substantial disparate impact.

543 We close with several other points. First, our study highlights considerable weaknesses in
544 the evidence base leading Congress to allow the faculty exemption to lapse in 1994. The leading
545 contemporaneous reports were unable to isolate the long-run effects of uncapping. Comprehensive
546 retrospective analyses may be much better powered to detect cumulative effects. Second, our
547 public school results suggest that university benefits may play a substantial role in facilitating
548 retirements. Our evidence shows that the proportion of faculty above 70 grew particularly in the
549 wake of the Great Recession, when (defined contribution) retirement accounts faced significant
550 losses. More generous retirement policies may directly benefit the elderly and indirectly benefit

¹²Our findings share some similarities with the tension between the use of seniority preference in employment decisions such as promotion and layoffs and the retention and advancement of women and minorities. Like uncapping, when seniority preference accrued disproportionately to white male workers due to discrimination against other groups, these preferences had adverse effects on integration (Cooper and Sobol, 1969). This tension between seniority and integration has received considerable attention in the legislative development, legal evolution, and academic study of Title VII and labor statutes (Rutherglen, 2012), but the effects of uncapping on the advancement of women and minorities has been largely overlooked.

551 minority and female aspiring faculty. Third, our work uncovers patterns in minority hiring that, to
552 our knowledge, have not been documented to date, at least in the law school context. Most of the
553 gains in minority hiring occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, with substantial flattening beginning in
554 the mid-2000s, most acutely following the Great Recession (see right panel of Figure 8). Last, our
555 suggestive results that the effects are acute for minority women are particularly troubling given the
556 barriers associated with “intersectionality” in the academy (Merritt and Reskin, 1992; Multicultural
557 Women Attorneys Network, 1994).

558 In sum, we hope that this study has provided more rigorous grounding of a key cause driving the
559 shift in the age composition of university faculty and an expanded understanding of its collateral
560 effects on efforts to diversify higher education.

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733 Appendix

734 A Data Collection

735 The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) annually publishes a directory of law teachers,
736 which lists faculty and selected staff at all member and fee-paying non-member institutions of the
737 AALS. To extract relevant information, we perform the steps described below.

738 A.1 PDF Scans and Optical Character Recognition

739 We rely on three regularly reported sections in the AALS directory: (1) the “Law Teachers by
740 School at Member Schools / Non-Member Fee-Paid Schools” section, which lists all law teachers
741 affiliated with a specific school; (2) the “Alphabetical List of Teachers (with Biographies)” section,
742 which provides biographical sketches of law teachers (including birth year, gender, degrees, degree
743 conferral dates, and employment history); and (3) the “Minority Law Teachers” listing of all law
744 teachers who identify as a member of a minority group and their school affiliation for that year.
745 Figure A1 displays representative pages of these sections from the 2011-2012 directory.

746 We start with the 1971 volume, because volumes are more regularly formatted starting in that
747 year and because pre-1971 data is unlikely to provide much leverage over assessing effects of
748 uncapping in 1994. For 1971-2007 and 2009-2011, we use PDF scans from HeinOnline. AALS
749 did not publish directories in 2008, 2012, and 2013, so we manually collect data for these years
750 (see section B.1). HeinOnline does not have volumes for 2014-2017, so we scanned these volumes
751 ourselves. In total, our PDF scans comprise over 42,000 pages from 43 directories.

752 To maintain high accuracy in optical character recognition, we use Prime Recognition, which
753 preserves line spacing, letter case, and column breaks to facilitate information extraction.

754 A.2 Information Extraction

755 We extract fields from the ASCII text streams using regular expressions in Python. For school
756 listings, we collect faculty name and title, as well as school of affiliation for each year. From bi-
757 ographical sketches, we collect faculty name, title, school affiliation, birth year where available,
758 gender where available, and degree years where available (undergraduate, law, and graduate de-
759 grees) for each year. From the minority listing, we parse the faculty name and school affiliation
760 for each year.

761 A.3 Faculty Classification

762 We classify law teachers into tenured/tenure-track faculty, emeritus faculty, clinical faculty/instructors,
763 and librarians based on titles. We create a dictionary of all variations of titles and map these into
764 classifications. First, we identify the titles that plainly indicate the class. For instance, “Prof.” and
765 “Ass’t Prof.” are plainly tenured/tenure-track, whereas “Prof. (Adj.)” and “Visiting Prof.” are not.
766 Second, for all ambiguous titles, we verify the correct class by: (a) searching the school’s online
767 directory or obtaining the school’s faculty handbook; (b) validating information in individual CVs.

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Figure A1: Page scans of AALS Directory for 2011-2012. The top left panel displays the first page of the "Law Teachers by School" listing; the top right panel shows the first page of the biographical sketches; and the bottom panel shows the minority law teachers listing.

768 These steps allow us to accurately classify titles and account for variation across schools. For ex-
769 ample, while “Acting Prof.” does not designate a tenure-track position at Stanford Law School, it
770 designates a tenure-track position at UC Berkeley.

771 **A.4 Record Linkage**

772 We develop a record linkage algorithm to construct a relational database to observe when faculty
773 members (a) are affiliated with a school, (b) have been granted tenure and (c) have been granted
774 emeritus status. In each year, we match faculty across school, faculty, and minority listings, using
775 fuzzy matching on name, title, and school affiliation.¹³

776 We then match faculty members across years. The algorithm used to carry out this record
777 linkage involves the following steps, tuned after substantial experimentation:

- 778 1. Using the list of faculty members in 1971, we create a new faculty ID to uniquely identify
779 each tenured/tenure-track faculty member.
- 780 2. For each subsequent year, we iterate through each faculty member and:
 - 781 (a) Record the name and school affiliation for the faculty member.
 - 782 (b) Search in the previous three years within that school for a fuzzy match on name.¹⁴ For
783 example, if ‘John Doe’ is at Stanford Law School in 1984, we search for name matches
784 at Stanford from 1983 to 1981. If a match is found, the existing faculty ID is assigned.
 - 785 (c) If there is no match within school in the past three years, search all faculty members
786 across all schools in the past three years for a fuzzy match on name and an exact match
787 on birth year, undergraduate degree year, law degree year, or graduate degree years. If
788 a match is found, the already created faculty ID of the match is assigned to this faculty
789 member. In instances of direct conflicts (e.g., a match on birth year but not degree
790 year), no match is made.
 - 791 (d) If no match is found when using supplementary biographical information, search all
792 faculty members across all schools in the past three years for an exact match on name
793 alone. Matches are manually verified before linking records.
 - 794 (e) If there is still no match for the faculty member, create a new faculty ID.

795 There are, to be sure, several limitations to this record linkage algorithm. Some faculty mem-
796 bers may have gaps in service of more than three years and thus fail to be matched. The algorithm
797 is less successful in linking law teachers with significant name changes across years (e.g. addition

¹³We allow for a Levenshtein distance of two when matching on each of name, title and school affiliation. This threshold is wide enough to recognize matches even when there are small differences in name representation (e.g., use of middle initial) and OCR errors in our text streams (added, omitted, or incorrectly specified characters), but is narrow enough to prevent false matches.

¹⁴We use a three year threshold at several points in the algorithm for several reasons. First, a three year window improves computational efficiency. Second, many schools maintain a policy for faculty to go on leave (e.g., for government service), but cap that period at two years. Third, expanding the search window increases the risk of false matches. As noted later in this section, we also compare all possible pairs of faculty and manually verify any matches. This process allows us to accurately match any faculty members who leave a school’s service for more than three years.

798 of a middle name, contraction of first name, changing surname). We hence carry out additional
799 checks to ensure that we are accurately identifying unique faculty members. First, we compare
800 all possible pairs of unique faculty members in our database using a more liberal fuzzy matching
801 on name and, where available, degree and birth years. All matches are manually verified and we
802 resolve 531 pairs of faculty members to the same ID. Second, because we were particularly con-
803 cerned that name changes are more likely for women after a change in marital status, we match on
804 first name, biographical information, and school affiliation alone and manually verify matches.

805 **A.5 School Meta-Data**

806 We augment AALS directory data with school meta-data from (a) law school rankings by U.S.
807 News and World Reports for 2004-2010; (b) American Bar Association disclosures to identify
808 whether a school is public or private.¹⁵

809 **A.6 Sample Definition**

810 Our main analysis sample includes active (i.e., non-retired) tenured/tenure-track faculty and ex-
811 cludes all other teaching and non-teaching staff (e.g., lecturers, clinical faculty, and academic
812 librarians). We perform robustness checks involving clinical faculty and librarians in sections D
813 and F.7, neither of which change our findings.

814 Our main analysis also excludes a certain number of schools. Because uncapping in 1994 was
815 a change in American law, we focus on continental law schools in the United States. We do not
816 include law schools in Hawaii and Puerto Rico because these are outliers in their demographic
817 composition. We also exclude historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) and the Judge
818 Advocate General's School because uncapping may have affected these schools quite differently.
819 Because we identify effects based on changes, we also exclude (a) a small number of law schools
820 that merged or split during the observation window,¹⁶ and (b) law schools that are members or
821 fee-paying non-members of AALS exclusively before or after their uncapping. As we show above
822 and F.6, our results are the same whether or not these school sample restrictions are made.

¹⁵ABA Required Disclosures, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/

¹⁶The mergers are comprised of: (1) Hamline University Law School and William Mitchell College of Law merging to form Mitchell Hamline School of Law in 2015; (2) Rutgers School of Law - Camden and Rutgers School of Law - Newark merging to form Rutgers Law School in 2015. The splits are comprised of: (1) Pennsylvania State University - Penn State Law splitting from Pennsylvania State University - Dickinson Law to form two distinct law schools in 2015; (2) Widener University Commonwealth Law School splitting from Widener University Delaware Law School to form two distinct law schools in 2015.

823 **B Data Validation**

824 We implement a range of data validation and correction measures to ensure the accuracy of our
825 database. Most importantly, we found that AALS errors are most prevalent from 2014-17, when
826 AALS “moved to a new data collection system.”¹⁷ Our manual validations addresses these issues
827 in the raw data, as we detail below. We also re-run all analyses excluding data from 2012-2017, as
828 described in Section F.3.

829 **B.1 Accounting for Missing Volumes**

830 AALS did not publish directories in 2008, 2012, and 2013. As such, we do not have data from the
831 AALS directly on law teachers during these years. We use a combination of manual and automated
832 processes to populate these missing years, which allows us to uncover time trends across different
833 dimensions. First, we assume that faculty members who appear, within the same school, before and
834 after the missing years remained at that school. For example, if John Doe is a professor at Stanford
835 Law School in the years 2007 and 2009, he is assumed to have also been a professor at Stanford
836 in 2008.¹⁸ Next, we manually investigate faculty members who (a) appear last in the year before a
837 missing volume or (b) appear first in year after a missing volume. For example, if John Doe’s last
838 year of appearance in our data set is 2011, we manually obtain information on his *actual* last year
839 of association with a school. We collect information on start and end of service using a variety
840 of sources: (a) individual faculty CVs, (b) LinkedIn profiles, (c) retirement announcements by a
841 school, and (d) the Wayback Machine (a digital archive of web pages) to examine historical faculty
842 pages. In total, we manually collect first and last years of service for 3,500 faculty members.

843 **B.2 Birth Years**

844 While we successfully extract birth years from faculty members’ biographical sketches for the
845 majority of observations, birth years are reported less regularly beginning in 2007 and cease being
846 reported entirely by 2014. This issue of missing birth years does not affect most faculty since we
847 can populate their birth year from a previous biographical sketch that contains this information.
848 Overall, 15.0% of tenured/tenure-track faculty members have no birth year reported in any year.

849 For faculty with missing birth years, we develop a simple model that predicts birth year based
850 on degree dates. A majority (53.8%) of faculty with missing birth years report at least one degree
851 year in a biographical sketch. For the remaining faculty, we first attempt to collect their degree
852 dates manually using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Missingness is more prevalent in re-
853 cent years, making it relatively easy to locate degree years. We use two MTurkers per faculty
854 member, with interrater agreement at 96%. The MTurk response rate was 70%, reflecting the fact
855 that some faculty are difficult to locate online. For these remaining faculty, we collect degree dates
856 by hand, using contemporaneous publications that sometimes list degree year, as well as archived

¹⁷Under this new system, deans provided AALS with a roster of their faculty and staff. Faculty members who previously appeared in the directories were then expected to log on to the online portal to make any necessary updates to their prior directory entry. New faculty were asked to create their directory entry through the online portal.

¹⁸Our process excludes the possibility of faculty both starting and ending a new faculty job within the missing years. This possibility seems unlikely, as it would be very rare for a faculty member to move laterally and return to the old faculty within two years.

857 announcements of achievements (nominations, hiring, endowments, etc.) with more detailed bi-
858 ographies.

859 We train simple regression models to predict birth years based on degree years, using faculty
860 members who report both. We concentrate on three degree types: undergraduate degree (BA, BS,
861 AB, etc), law degree (JD), and Bachelor of Law (LLB). In the U.S. system, law school requires
862 an undergraduate degree and LLB's are primarily from foreign institutions. We randomly split the
863 population of faculty with both birth and degree years observed into 80% training set and a 20%
864 test set. We fit separate regressions for each degree type using the training set, with interactions of
865 degree year and degree decade to account for secular trends. We give priority to predictions based
866 on undergraduate degrees, followed by law degree, and then LLB's. After plotting the correlation
867 between predicted birth year and reported birth year for a (random) test set, we fit a least squares
868 line, which yields an R^2 of 0.98.

869 After this imputation, we are left with 2.6% of all faculty without observed or predicted birth
870 years. These faculty members are spread uniformly across all years of observation and unlikely to
871 create any biases in our results. We omit these faculty from our analyses involving age.

872 **B.3 Gender**

873 Biographical sketches include gender from 1986-2011. Of faculty who appear before 1986, 63.7%
874 reported gender after 1986. Similarly, of faculty who appear after 2011, 75.0% reported gender
875 before 2011.

876 There are three remaining sources of missingness. First, there are 2,451 faculty members who
877 appear and leave the directories before 1986. Second, 651 faculty appear for the first time after
878 2011. Third, there are 1,979 faculty who appear between 1986-2011, but do not report gender at
879 any point.

880 For these remaining faculty, we use name and birth-year-based methods to predict gender. We
881 investigated several available methods. We assess the accuracy of these models on our own data,
882 using faculty members who report a gender in their biographical sketch as the test set. We select
883 the model based on U.S Social Security Administration baby names data because it had the highest
884 accuracy rate: 99%.¹⁹

885 We are able to predict gender of 95.6% of faculty with missing gender. The remaining group
886 of 222 faculty members mostly had non-traditional U.S. names. For these remaining faculty, we
887 manually collected gender. For further validation, we examine the weakest classifications (mostly
888 gender-neutral names such as "Taylor") and manually verify gender. We omit the 26 faculty mem-
889 bers whose gender could not be verified online.

890 **B.4 Minority Status**

891 The Minority Law Teachers listing is available from 1986-2017. We rely on the minority listing
892 because it is the only source we are aware of that provides reliable, multi-institution, multi-year
893 data on the racial composition of tenured/ tenure-track faculty at U.S. law schools. These data are

¹⁹We use the R package 'gender'(Mullen, 2018) (<https://github.com/ropensci/gender>). It provides the option to use models based on historical datasets from the U.S. Social Security Administration, the U.S. Census Bureau (via IPUMS USA), the North Atlantic Population Project, or the Kantowitz corpus of male and female names to provide predictions of gender.

894 commonly used in studies on the demographics of law faculty (Bell and Delgado, 1989; Redding,
895 2003; McCrary et al., 2016). The few studies on this topic that do not use the AALS directories
896 rely on sources that provide only a limited number of years or institutions (Chused, 1988).

897 We assume that faculty members who appear in any year's minority listing are minorities in
898 all years. Faculty members who do not appear in any minority listing are assumed to be non-
899 minorities. For faculty in the years prior to 1986 (before the AALS begins publishing the minority
900 listing), we are able to infer 67.5% of their minority statuses due to post-1986 service.

901 We consider three reasons why our data on faculty minority status may not be complete and
902 how these issues would affect our results. First, there are 2,451 faculty members who were never
903 asked to report their race/ethnicity to the AALS because they left legal academia prior to 1986.
904 While we expect that a large majority of these faculty were white based on descriptive studies
905 at the time, some of these faculty may have identified as minority had they been asked by the
906 AALS (Chused, 1988). Because of this issue, our data may be understating faculty diversity prior
907 to 1986. Second, minority faculty may choose not to self-identify. This issue would also imply
908 that our data underestimates faculty diversity. Moreover, if the propensity of minority faculty to
909 self-report changes during the observation window and is correlated with faculty age composition,
910 this issue would confound our estimates of the effect of faculty age composition on diversification.
911 Third, the AALS's move to the new data collection system towards the end of the observation
912 window (2014-2017) may have increased non-response overall (see Section B). Thus, some mi-
913 nority faculty in recent years may not appear on the listing because they did not complete any
914 part of the questionnaire before the end of our observation window. If non-response of minority
915 faculty increases towards the end of the observation window, this issue might have contributed to
916 the declines in the rate of diversification that we observe.

917 We address these potential concerns in several ways. First, we compare our data to the few
918 other sources on faculty demographics across law schools that exist. These sources offer the added
919 advantage of providing data from before 1986 (before the AALS directories included the minority
920 listing) (concern 1) and data that is not strictly self-reported (concern 2). Specifically, we compare
921 our data to Chused (1988), who asked administrators at AALS law schools in 1980 and 1986 to
922 report faculty demographic information, and to a special release of data from the ABA, which
923 collected data from administrators at ABA-approved law schools on minority tenured/tenure-track
924 law faculty in the fall of 2013.²⁰ We do not find evidence that our data understate the number
925 of minority faculty prior to 1986 or in subsequent years. Chused reports that the proportion of
926 tenured/tenure-track professors who were minority was 3.6% in the 1980-1981 academic year,
927 which is comparable to the proportion of tenured/tenure-track professors identified as minority our
928 dataset in that year: 4.8%. In later years, we also find that data from external sources is consistent
929 with ours. In the 1986-1987 academic year, Chused reports that 5.0% of tenured/tenured-track
930 faculty were minority and our data reports 7.5% for this year. In 2013, 19.8% of tenured/tenure-
931 track faculty were minority according to the ABA data, compared to 18.1% in our data. The small
932 discrepancies between these benchmarks and our data likely stem from differences in the sample
933 of schools used to generate these numbers.²¹

²⁰These data were collected as part of the ABA's 2013 Annual Questionnaire. Data accessed on May 15, 2019, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/statistics-archives/

²¹For example, Chused received responses from 144 schools in 1980 and 149 schools in 1986, whereas our full sample of schools consists of 170 and 175 institutions in these years. While Chused does not provide detail on all the schools that did not respond, we expect that Chused may have reported fewer minority faculty than our data because

934 Second, we also consider the possibility that the propensity of minority faculty to self-identify
935 has declined and that such patterns of self-identification may be correlated with institutions' fac-
936 ulty age composition (concern 2). To be sure, researchers have found a variety of individual and
937 contextual factors shape decisions about racial self-identification (Sen and Wasow, 2016; Yoshino,
938 2006). However, we do not find evidence that minority self-identification has systematically de-
939 clined during the observation period (Roth, 2016; Sen and Wasow, 2016). If anything, prior re-
940 search suggests the reverse.²² Even if one thinks that declines in self-identification occurred among
941 minority individuals, it is less plausible that such declines are more acute after 1994 specifically
942 in schools with high proportions of retirement eligible faculty. If the age composition indeed af-
943 fected the propensity by faculty to racially “cover,” that would itself be a notable treatment effect
944 of uncapping (Yoshino, 2006).

945 Third, to address all three concerns, we use an additional measure of minority status: name-
946 based predictions of faculty race/ethnicity. We note two limitations from the outset: (a) this method
947 is often unable to identify minority individuals who have surnames that are not typically or exclu-
948 sively associated with a minority group; and (b) this method is particularly ill-suited to identify
949 minority women who adopt the surname of a non-minority partner (or vice versa). Notwithstand-
950 ing these limitations, this method is frequently used in a range of research fields (see, for example,
951 Imai and Khanna, 2016; Elliott et al., 2009)). We identify four imputation methods that predict
952 race/ethnicity from first and/or last name using models that differ based on data and learning algo-
953 rithm. ²³ Identifying the package with the most accurate predictions for our dataset is inherently
954 difficult, due to the subjective nature of racial identity and the absence of ground truth (Roth,
955 2016). From sampling faculty predicted to be minority by each of the packages, we find that (a)
956 models appear more accurate in predicting Hispanic and Asian or Pacific Islander (API) faculty
957 than African American faculty and (b) the prediction package which uses 2010 census data on
958 an LSTM model seems to produce the most accurate predictions (for API and Hispanic faculty).
959 Therefore, we select the LSTM model and use its predictions for API and Hispanic. The minor-
960 ity prediction package identifies an additional 124 to 360 API or Hispanic faculty, depending on

his data included fewer predominantly minority institutions. Chused reports that five “minority-operated” institutions (HBCUs, schools in Puerto Rico and schools in Hawaii) responded to the survey in 1980 and six responded in 1986, whereas our dataset includes nine of such institutions in these years. The ABA data comes from ABA-approved law schools, which totaled 203 in 2013, whereas our full data used to generate the numbers reported above consists of 197 schools. To be sure, the discrepancy may be larger because the ABA noted there was non-response on questions used to generate the report.

²²Researchers have found evidence of increases in the propensity of individuals to identify as American Indian/Alaska Native: “In each census since 1960, there have been hundreds of thousands of new American Indians – people who joined the population through response changes rather than birth or immigration” (Liebler and Ortyl, 2014). Some of the largest proportionate increases in American Indian/Alaska Native self-identification occurred among a subset— highly-educated adults—that encompasses our population of interest (law school faculty) (Liebler and Ortyl, 2014). While this shift may have contributed to the uptick in diversification in the early part of our observation window, it cannot explain the decline in diversification rates that we observe following uncapping: American Indian/Alaska Native self-identification continued to increase in the two censuses following uncapping (2000 and 2010) (Liebler and Ortyl, 2014). Liebler et al.’s comparison of individuals’ responses in the 2000 Census to their responses in the 2010 Census also found that it was more common for individuals to shift from identifying as white in 2000 to identifying as a minority in 2010 than the reverse (Liebler et al., 2014).

²³The python package *ethnicolr* (<https://github.com/appeler/ethnicolr>) provides 3 main methods for ethnicity prediction: (1) an long short-term memory (LSTM) model trained using census data for 2000 or 2010, (2) an LSTM model trained using Wikipedia data, and (3) an LSTM model trained using Florida voter registration data. The R package *wru* (<https://github.com/kosukeimai/wru>) uses a Bayesian prediction model trained on Census data.

961 prediction threshold, who are not identified as minority in the AALS. As a robustness check, we
 962 assess whether the time trends and regression results persist when incorporating these predictions
 963 (Section F.4).

964 Finally, we present results using data that excludes years before 1986 and after 2014 (concerns
 965 1 and 3). See Section F.4 for results.




Figure A2: Minority Predictions. Proportion faculty predicted to be Asian or Pacific Islander (API), Hispanic, or either over time. An LSTM model trained using 2010 census data was used to generate probabilities of faculty members being one of white, black, API or Hispanic based on last name. The “No Prediction” line plots the proportion of all faculty members who self identify as a minority in the AALS directories across time, analogous to the right panel of Figure 8 in the manuscript. The 80% threshold line represents the proportion of faculty members who self-identified as a minority *or* were predicted with probability greater than 80% to be API, Hispanic or either (left, center and right panels respectively). Similar logic was used for all other threshold percentages. “All predictions” represents the proportion of faculty members who self-identified as a minority *or* had the highest probability (regardless of absolute value) of being API, Hispanic, or either (left, center and right panels respectively).

966 B.5 Titles

967 Some individuals provided no titles in either the school or biographical listing. This issue of
 968 missing titles primarily affects 2014-2017. While only one individual had a missing title in 2011,
 969 there were 223 such individuals in 2017. Much of this appears to be explained by the transition to
 970 AALS’s new data collection system, since missing titles disproportionately appear to affect new
 971 junior faculty hired in this period. We suspect that this stems from a delay in entering biographic
 972 details to AALS, as the rate of missingness spikes in 2014 and decreases by 2017. Such a pattern
 973 of missingness could potentially lead to underestimates of the number of junior faculty hired in
 974 recent years, therefore biasing our results.

975 To address this issue, we identify the nearest title within a three-year bandwidth for each af-
 976 fected faculty member. For instance, for a faculty member missing a title in 2014, we search for
 977 titles in the three preceding and three subsequent volumes for that faculty member.²⁴ The most
 978 proximate title found is then assumed to be their title in 2014. With this automated process, we
 979 were able to populate the titles of more than 80% of faculty with missing information.

980 Second, we manually search for titles (and other biographical details as described above) for
 981 all remaining faculty members through web searches. Because most of these hires were recent,

²⁴The years would be 2015-17 and 2009-11, as AALS did not publish directories in 2012-2013.

982 this was a straightforward way to complete the AALS title information.

983 **B.6 Emeritus Status**

984 Starting in 2014, we find that a number of faculty members who had recently been conferred
985 emeritus status did not update their titles in the AALS directory to reflect this change. This issue
986 would inflate the average faculty age, as the retirement of (usually) older faculty members would
987 not be reflected until several years after actual retirement or not at all.

988 To address this issue, we perform a manual check of all faculty members over the age of 70 in
989 the years 2014-2017 who do not report an emeritus title. As before, we conduct a series of web
990 searches for faculty pages and personal pages, including pages that are archived on the Wayback
991 Machine. Of 1,372 faculty members, we find that 540 had retired or taken emeritus between 2014
992 and 2017. We record their retirement year and treat them as retired / emeritus for all subsequent
993 years.

994 C Applicant Pool

995 We now investigate whether the declining rate of diversification after 1994 may be attributable
996 to changes in the applicant pool. This mechanism may be particularly relevant after the Great
997 Recession. The financial shock may have simultaneously caused faculty members to stay active
998 longer than anticipated and disproportionately led attorneys of color to stay at law firm positions
999 rather than risk going on the entry-level job market. (It is common for attorneys to practice for
1000 several years before going on the legal academic job market.)

1001 To examine this potential explanation, we compile data on the demographics of applicants for
1002 entry-level teaching positions from two sources to cover 1990-2017. First, from 1990-2008, we
1003 use information on applicants from AALS's annual Statistical Reports on Law School Faculty and
1004 Candidates. Second, because AALS ceased publishing these statistics in 2008, we rely on hand
1005 collected applicant demographic information from the AALS Faculty Appointments Register from
1006 2000-17, which contain application forms of all applicants during these years. The overlapping
1007 period allows us to examine discrepancies due to the different measurements (e.g., for multi-racial
1008 candidates). One limitation of these data sources is that they do not consistently report statistics
1009 for minority female job applicants.

1010 Figure A3 shows that the proportion of job applicants who are female and the proportion of
1011 job applicants who are minority has been increasing. We interpret these findings as evidence that
1012 the decline in the rate of diversification cannot be attributed to a decline in female and minority
1013 applicants for faculty positions. If anything, the proportion of female and minority applicants
1014 increased after the Great Recession, potentially due to layoffs at law firms.²⁵




Figure A3: Applicants for faculty positions over time. The left panel plots the proportion of applicants who were female, while the right panel displays the proportion of minority applicants. The darker line reflect data from the Association of American Law Schools' (AALS) Statistical Report on Law School Faculty, which was available for the years 1990 to 2008. The lighter gray line reflects data from the AALS Faculty Appointments Register for the years 2000 to 2017.

²⁵We cannot say anything about the quality of the applicant pool. It is possible, for instance, that layoffs caused an increase in less competitive applicants, but it is difficult to systematically measure the quality of the applicant pool.

1015 **D The Growth and Diversity of Clinical Faculty**

1016 Our main analyses exclude clinical faculty for two reasons. First, most clinical faculty are not on
1017 the tenured / tenure-track line, and hence unaffected by uncapping (Adamson et al., 2012). Second,
1018 even in the rare instances that clinicians are tenured / tenure-track, because directing a legal clinic
1019 can require significant day-to-day management, such positions may not be as prone to the concerns
1020 that originally motivated the exemption in 1986.

1021 That said, we encountered some uncertainties in inferring whether a faculty member is tenured
1022 / tenure-track or a clinical faculty member based on the title. For instance, a title of “Ass’t. Prof.
1023 & Dir. Clinical Educ.” may be tenure track or a clinical title. We sampled faculty and found that
1024 in most cases, faculty members who are directors of clinics, but also have titles that imply they are
1025 tenured / tenure-track (as in the example above), are on the tenure line. As such, we include 544
1026 of such faculty in our main analysis. Faculty with titles such as “Dir., Legal Aid Clinic” or “Lect.
1027 and Dir., Civil Clinical Prog.”, however, are not considered tenured/tenure-track.

1028 We assess sensitivity to this measurement here by re-estimating models excluding all individu-
1029 als who are listed as directors of clinics from our sample. Row (A) of Table A1 shows results are
1030 comparable.

1031 One concern with the elimination of mandatory retirement has been that universities shifted to
1032 contract or contingent (untenured) faculty (Ehrenberg, 2006). It is hence possible that universities
1033 have generated the appearance of greater diversity by hiring untenured faculty. In law schools, the
1034 rise of experiential education has contributed to growth in untenured positions. Since the 1960s,
1035 American law schools have expanded opportunities for students to develop professional practice
1036 skills through participation in clinics. Beginning in 2005, the ABA began adding experiential
1037 learning requirements for all students in law school accreditation standards (Adamson et al., 2008).
1038 As a result, the number of clinical faculty positions, which are most often non-tenured, has grown
1039 substantially over the past several decades (Adamson et al., 2008).

1040 Our data on clinical faculty allow us to assess whether law schools may have diversified facul-
1041 ties through clinical hiring. The left panel of Figure A4 plots the proportion of faculty comprised
1042 of clinicians, demonstrating substantial growth from the 1970s to the present. This growth is con-
1043 sistent with historical accounts of the rise of legal education (Carey, 2002). The methodological
1044 challenge here is that a number of schools cease reporting clinical faculty after 2011. We hence
1045 focus our analysis on the 1971-2011 period. The middle and right panels of Figure A4 show time
1046 series plots of the proportion of clinical faculty that are female and minority, respectively. We
1047 observe that compared to tenured/tenure-track faculty, clinical faculty are substantially more likely
1048 to be female, but less likely to be members of a minority group. In both instances, diversification
1049 appears to slow down after uncapping. These findings do not corroborate the notion that uncapping
1050 shifted schools to diversification using clinical lines.

		Junior faculty	Female faculty	Minority faculty	Minority female faculty
(A) Clinical Definition	Prop. Over 70	-0.80** (0.32)	-0.53*** (0.16)	-0.69** (0.27)	-1.03** (0.53)
	<i>N</i>	7,470	7,470	7,470	7,470
(B) Linear Model	Prop. Over 70	-0.18** (0.09)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.04* (0.02)
	<i>N</i>	7,470	7,470	7,470	7,470
(C) Junior Faculty	Prop. Junior		0.51*** (0.07)	0.32* (0.17)	0.46* (0.24)
	<i>N</i>		7,470	7,470	7,470
(D) Post-2011 Data Quality	Prop. Over 70	-0.56 (0.38)	-0.38* (0.19)	-0.79** (0.34)	-0.88 (0.73)
	<i>N</i>	6,489	6,489	6,489	6,489
(E) Post-1986 Minority	Prop. Over 70			-0.44* (0.26)	-0.82* (0.42)
	<i>N</i>			5,290	5,290
(F) Fully Balanced Panel	Prop. Over 70	-1.04*** (0.36)	-0.56*** (0.16)	-0.85*** (0.29)	-1.04** (0.53)
	<i>N</i>	6,256	6,256	6,256	6,256
(G) Mergers & Splits	Prop. Over 70	-0.51** (0.25)	-0.40*** (0.13)	-0.54** (0.23)	-0.85* (0.46)
	<i>N</i>	7,482	7,482	7,482	7,482
(H) Librarians	Prop. Over 70	-0.52** (0.25)	-0.32** (0.13)	-0.49** (0.23)	-0.83* (0.47)
	<i>N</i>	7,470	7,470	7,470	7,470

Table A1: Regression Results for Additional Robustness Checks. Rows (A), (C)-(H) present (quasi-poisson) count model results and Row (B) presents linear regression results. Rows (A), (D)-(H) regress proportion faculty over 70 in the prior year on count junior, female, minority, and minority female faculty with faculty size as an offset. Row (B) regresses proportion faculty over 70 in the prior year on proportion junior, female, minority, and minority female faculty. Row (C) regresses proportion junior faculty in the prior year on proportion female, minority, and minority female faculty with faculty size as an offset. Row (A) excludes directors of clinics with titles that appear to indicate tenured/tenure-track status. Row (D) excluded directory listings from 2014-2017. Row (E) excludes directory listings from 1971-1985. Row (F) uses only schools that appear in all years from 1971 to 2017. Row (G) includes schools that were the product of mergers or that split during the observation window. Row (H) includes librarian faculty with titles that appear to indicate tenured/tenure-track status. Observations are at the school-year level. All regressions have school and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. */**/** denote statistical significance at α - levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.




Figure A4: Clinical faculty over time. The left panel plots the proportion of all faculty that are clinical. We do not manually collect data for clinical faculty for the 2008 missing volume - this data point is extrapolated and represented using a dotted line. The middle panel shows the proportion female across time and the right panel shows proportion minority. In the middle and right panels, plots of proportions for tenured/tenure-track faculty only are added for reference. The vertical blue line in all plots shows the federal uncapping year (1994).

1051 **E Alternative Measure of Faculty Retirement**

1052 One of the challenges to our survival analysis is that faculty may leave the AALS directory for
1053 many reasons other than retirement: e.g., death or taking a non-faculty position. In the main anal-
1054 yses, we hence condition on a faculty member being above age 50 to construct our cohort survival
1055 analyses. We here consider one alternative measure for retirement, namely when an individual is
1056 awarded emeritus status.

1057 At the outset, we note one principal limitation to this measure. The meaning of “emeritus”
1058 status has changed considerably over time, and may itself be affected by uncapping. During the
1059 beginning of our observation period, the status was an honorific title, conferred to the most distin-
1060 guished professors (Mauch et al., 1990). Over time, conferring emeritus appears to have become
1061 more common and provide a wider array of privileges, plausibly because universities have grappled
1062 with providing incentives for retirement (Mauch et al., 1990; Burton Jr., 1987).

1063 We nonetheless examine the age at which emeritus status is granted to faculty, plotted in Fig-
1064 ure A5. The left panel presents the distribution pre-1994, showing a sharp spike before the age of
1065 70. The right panel presents the distribution after 1994, which suggests a much longer right tail.
1066 These findings corroborate that uncapping has led to delayed retirement.




Figure A5: Age at Emeritus Status Conferral. Distribution of the age at which faculty take emeritus status for faculty who turned 70 prior to (left) and after (right) uncapping. For visibility, ages are trimmed at 50 and 90 years old.

1067 **F Robustness Checks**

1068 We now present a series of additional robustness checks.

1069 **F.1 Linear Model**

1070 First, instead of using a count model, Row (B) of Table A1 presents results from a simple linear
1071 regression that looks at the relationship between the proportion of faculty over the age of 70 in the
1072 prior year and the proportion of faculty that are junior, female, minority and minority female. Our
1073 results persist in this linear specification.

1074 **F.2 Mechanism of Junior Faculty Hiring**

1075 In our main analyses, we presented evidence that the proportion of faculty over 70 is significantly
1076 negatively correlated with the count of junior faculty and, separately, that the proportion of faculty
1077 over 70 is also significantly negatively correlated with the number of female, minority, and minority
1078 female faculty members. We supplement these findings by presenting models that directly estimate
1079 the effects of junior faculty size on the number of female and minority faculty members. We use the
1080 lagged proportion of junior faculty in the prior year as the explanatory variable to exclude the direct
1081 effect a hire in a specific year. Row (C) of Table A1 presents the results. As expected, we find that
1082 schools with a smaller junior faculty have significantly lower levels of racial and gender diversity.
1083 These results provide further evidence of the mechanism underlying the trade-off between delayed
1084 retirement of senior faculty and diversification: delayed retirements reduce schools' opportunities
1085 for hiring junior faculty, which in turn limits diversification.

1086 **F.3 Post-2011 Data Quality**

1087 As discussed in section B, we find that data quality declines in the years 2014-2017, when AALS
1088 transitioned to a new data collection system. While we thoroughly address these issues through a
1089 combination of manual and automated processes documented above, we investigate here whether
1090 our results are affected by any remaining data quality issues. We fit regressions excluding data from
1091 the post-2014 period. Because AALS did not publish any directories in 2012 and 2013, we hence
1092 use only data from 1971 - 2011. Row (D) of Table A1 presents results, which are substantively
1093 comparable, with two slight differences. The coefficients on junior faculty and minority female
1094 faculty become statistically insignificant, but point estimates remain at the same magnitude. Sta-
1095 tistical precision of estimates is likely driven by the sharp rise in retirement-eligible faculty after
1096 the Great Recession.

1097 **F.4 Minority Robustness**

1098 As reported in Section B.4, we account for potential under-reporting in the AALS minority list by
1099 cross-referencing faculty members over time and using model-based techniques to impute ethnicity
1100 based on year and age. We now conduct two further sensitivity analyses.

1101 First, we address the possibility that we are undercounting minority presence before AALS
 1102 published the minority listing in 1986. Row (E) of Table A1 presents the minority faculty regres-
 1103 sion results excluding the years 1971-1986. Results are substantively the same. Second, after using
 1104 the prediction models described in Section B.4, we plot time trends for the proportion of faculty
 1105 members predicted to be API and Hispanic at different probability thresholds, as shown in Fig-
 1106 ure A2. The figure also includes those faculty members who appear in the AALS minority listing.
 1107 We find that the trend of diminished minority growth after the 1994 uncapping persists with the
 1108 addition of predicted API and Hispanic minority faculty, regardless of probability threshold. We
 1109 also re-fit models using different probability thresholds for whether a faculty member is minority.
 1110 Table A2 presents results, which are again substantively comparable.

	Minority Faculty							
	All Pred.	Predicted API			Predicted Hispanic			
		40%	60%	80%	All Pred.	40%	60%	80%
Prop. Over 70	-0.55** (0.22)	-0.53** (0.22)	-0.63*** (0.23)	-0.62*** (0.23)	-0.47** (0.21)	-0.46** (0.21)	-0.41* (0.22)	-0.44* (0.23)
School FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A2: Regression Results Using Minority Predictions. Quasi-Poisson count regression of faculty self-identifying as minority or predicted as API (left columns) or Hispanic (right columns) at different classification thresholds of ethnicity prediction, with proportion faculty over 70 in the prior year as chief explanatory variable and faculty size as an offset. Observations are at the school-year level. $N = 7,470$. FE indicate fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. */**/** denote statistical significance at α - levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.

1111 F.5 Fully Balanced Panel

1112 In our main analyses, 137 of 166 schools included are observed for the full observation window
 1113 (1971-2017). While the remaining 29 schools are observed before and after uncapping, they are not
 1114 present for the full period. 25 of these 29 schools became members or fee-paying non-members of
 1115 the AALS after 1971 (between 1972-1989) and two pairs of schools merged in 2015. We include
 1116 these schools in the main analyses because they allow us to examine effects on schools existing
 1117 both in the capped and uncapped schemes. Some schools might exit, for instance, if uncapping
 1118 negatively affected productivity and quality of teaching. One disadvantage to our main sample,
 1119 however, is that the composition of schools changes. The intensive margin (faculty composition)
 1120 may be distinct from the extensive margin (exit). We hence fit models on a fully balanced panel
 1121 of institutions present in the data from 1971-2017. As Row (F) of Table A1 shows, the results are
 1122 substantively the same.

1123 F.6 Splits and Mergers

1124 We also assess sensitivity to including schools that were subject to splits and mergers during the
 1125 observation window. In addition to two instances where two schools merged, two schools split. It

1126 is possible, however, that such reorganizations are a response to uncapping. Mergers could have
1127 been partially affected by adapting to the growth in retirement-eligible faculty. And splits might
1128 have been influenced by the potential to re-build a faculty in light of demographic trends. We hence
1129 fit count models including these mergers and splits, and find comparable result as shown in Row
1130 (G) of Table A1.

1131 **F.7 Librarians**

1132 In our main analyses, we exclude librarians. Yet a minority of schools confers “faculty status”
1133 on librarians.²⁶ The effect of uncapping on the likelihood of academic librarians to retire remains
1134 unclear, as such status is typically conferred on the director of a law library, which is accompanied
1135 by significant managerial responsibilities. Law librarians may therefore have fewer incentives to
1136 stay long into retirement age.

1137 We nonetheless examine whether our results are sensitive to the exclusion of law librarians. We
1138 add to our main sample all librarians whose title appears to indicate faculty status. For instance,
1139 we include individuals denoted as “Librarian and Ass’t. Prof.” We do not include librarians whose
1140 titles affirmatively suggest no faculty status (e.g., “Adj. Ass’t. Prof. and Librarian”). Row (H)
1141 of Table A1 presents regression estimates including librarians, with comparable results. We note
1142 one additional finding, which is that a number of law schools appear to have diversified the faculty
1143 early on via the hiring of law librarians with faculty status.

²⁶See Parker (2011) (“Consequently, today only between one-quarter and one-third of law librarians report holding faculty status.”). This norm has admittedly changed over time. Compare Bailey and Dee (1974).